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Federal Lending and Loan Insurance
Programs for Businessand Financial
Institutions
Development of the Programs
WHEREAS World War II was to bring federal credit programs to
bear on a vast scale and in a wide range of industries, only limited
segments of business received such aid in the earlier world war. The
War Pinance Corporation, established in 1918, helped finance cer-
tain essential war industries. The Director General of Railroads in
1919 and the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1920 were em-
powered to lend to railroads, which from 1918 through February
1920 were under federal operation. Specifically, financial assistance
to the railroads consisted of operating loans made by the Director
General out of a $500 million revolving fund, notes taken in payment
for capital improvements and purchases of rolling stock, and certain
loans made on the cessation of federal control, from a $300 million
revolving fund set up under the Transportation Act of 1920 and
administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission. New loans
by the War Finance Corporation ceased after 1922, and new loans
by the ICC, after 1924. There remained a program of loans for
shipping.
Legislative action designed to promote United States shipping
began with the Shipping Act of 1916 (34 Stat. 728), which created
the U.S. Shipping Board. During World War I the board's efforts
to increase the U.S. merchant fleet were carried out through a sub-
sidiary, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and after the war a re-
volving fund of $125 million was established by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 988) to finance ship construction in domestic
yards. The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 689) reaffirmed
the policy of financial aid to shipping concerns and supplemented it
with a system of mail contract subsidies; but the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 (49 Stat. 1985; 46 U.S.C. 1111), established the
U.S. Maritime Commission as an independent agency in the Executive
Branch, constituted a reorientation of policy. The commission sought
to stimulate shipbuilding by a system of direct subsidies intended to
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make up the difference between domestic and foreign cost of ship
operation, and by an indirect subsidy program under which the
commission produced and sold merchant vessels to American ship-
owners at prices below their actual cost in order to equalize the
cost differential between domestic and foreign-built ships. The com-
mission was also authorized to insure mortgages on all types of
vessels owned by United States citizens and to make direct loans
to shipping interests. Under Reorganization Planof 1950, the
U.S. Maritime Commission was reorganized as the Maritime Ad-
ministration and transferred to the Department of Commerce.
Meanwhile the depression of the early thirties had brought federal
credit activity into other areas of business, with the establishment
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932—like all the
foregoing organizations, a direct agency of the federal government.
At first the authority conferred by the RFC Act (47 Stat. 5; 15
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) was of limited scope, directed mainly at the
assistance of financial institutions (including banks and insurance
companies) and of railroads. It was thought that aid to these stra-
tegic enterprises, many of which were under severe pressure at the
time, would forestall the spread of unemployment. However, as
financial and industrial difficulties became more insistent the need
for a full-scale business lending program gathered force. A policy
of aid granted at key points—at the top, as it were, of the economic
pyramid—was replaced by a policy of supplying credit to business
concerns generally. In 1934 the RFC was authorized to make loans
directly to business where funds were not available from private
lenders, and the Federal Reserve Banks were empowered, under
Section 13b of the Federal Reserve Act, to undertake a similar pro-
gram of direct lending.1 The various extensions and revisions of
RFC's lending authority and the precise nature of the financial
assistance extended are described at some length in Appendix B.
In compact form the variety of RFC's credit activities—through
which from 1934 till its dissolution in 1953 the corporation disbursed
$15 billion in direct business lending alone, apart from its loan
1 Section 13b of the Federal Reserve Act and Section Sd of the Reconstruction
Act were both added to the original statutes by acts of June 19, 1934
(44 Stat. 1105, Ch. 653, and 48 Stat. 1108-1109, respectively).
It is interesting to note that in the hearings that prefaced the adoption of
Section 13b the Federal Reserve authorities sponsored a more novel arrangement
which would have provided for the extension of business credits by federally
sponsored "industrial banks."
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guaranteeing functions—has been shown in the listing in Chapter 1.
In the field of business lending, the year 1934 was notable also
for the establishment of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.
The bank was set up under Sectionof Title I of the National in-
dustrial Recovery Act (48 Stat. 195) with the specific purpose of
helping finance trade between the United States and Soviet Russia.
The bank did no business, however, on the ground that it could not
do so as long as the settlement of debts and claims between the United
States and the Soviet Union was still pending, and another institu-
tion, the Export-Import Bank of Washington, D.C., was also created
in 1934. The initial purpose of this second bank was to promote
trade between the United States and Cuba, but its functions were
later extended to all countries except the Soviet Union. With the
breakdown of debt settlement negotiations between the United States
and Russia in 1935, the second bank was discontinued and all opera-
tions were concentrated in the Export-Import Bank of Washington.
Over the years the Export-Import Bank has functioned primarily
to finance exports of agricultural and industrial equipment, notably
heavy machinery. Volumewise, among public institutions lending to
business in the period under review it was second only to RFC, with
loans financing trade with American firms totaling $4.6 billion from
1934 through 1953. Its original common stock of $1 million was
subscribed by the Treasury, and preferred stock in much larger
amount was taken up by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 increased the bank's capitali-
zation to $1 billion wholly subscribed by the Treasury. Not only by
the source of its funds but also in management the bank is directly
attached to the federal government, its original board of trustees
and currently its president being appointed directly by the President.
The prospect of very large amounts of war production work on a
basis that presented difficult credit problems led to an important
innovation in finance.early in World War II. This was Regulation V
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under
which the War and Navy Departments and theU.S. Maritime Com-
mission guaranteed loans to war contractors by any lending agency,
including the Federal Reserve Banks and the RFC. The regulation
was issued April 6, under Executive Order dated March
p26, 194f2, and the program whichauthorized was carried out by
the Federal Reserve Banks as agents for the contracting services.
The loans made under this original regulation were known as V
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loans; subsequently (September 1, 1943) the regulation was amended
to permit the guarantee of loans made partially to replenish work-
ing capital upon the termination of war contracts, the so-called VT
loan; and finally (September 1944) it was revised to permit the
guarantee of loans exclusively to liquidate working capital tied up
in terminated government contracts, the so-called T loans (author-
ized by the Contract Settlement Act of 1944).2 Also under the re-
vised authority of 1944, loans for production purposes or for a
combination of production and termination financing purposes were
made available, known as 1944-V loans.
This program carried into a new field, and extended to a very large
volume of financing operations, the procedures of loan insurance
first developed for real estate mortgages. Its effect, of course, was
to meet enormous financing needs without recourse to direct govern-
ment financing, though the inapplicability of the program to the
financing of plant and equipment forced the government to enter
that field through other and more direct measures, such as the con-
struction and leasing of facilities by the Defense Plants Corporation
and the direct extension of credits by the RFC and the Smaller War
Plants Corporation.
In 1944 the Veterans' Administration was empowered to guar-
antee small term loans to veterans for establishing or expanding a
business, and in December 1945 a reserve account form of loan
insurance was added to the program.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 932) placed re-
newed emphasis on lending and .loan guaranteeing activities related
to the government's procurement and stock-piling operations for
national defense. Both the RFC and the Export-Import Bank were
directed by Executive Order 10281 of August 27, 1951 to make loans
and to participate with other lenders in making loans to private busi-
ness enterprises for plant expansion, technological development, and
production of1 essential materials (including metals and minerals)
upon certification of essentiality by the Defense Production Admin-
istration—currently the Office of Defense Mobilization—or any other
designated federal agency, as provided by Sections 302 and 304 of
the Defense Production Act of 1950. Guarantees by government pro-
2Asummary of the programs is given in "Financing War Production and
Contract Terminations under Regulation V," in the Federal Reserve
March 1946, pp. 240—248, and in the technical paper "A Statistical Study of
Regulation V Loans," by Susan S. Burr and Elizabeth B. Sette (Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 1950).
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curement agencies of such loans made by public or private financing
institutions were also authorized, by Section 301 of the act, using
the facilities of the Federal Reserve Banks and under the conditions
and terms established by Regulation V of World War IL
The legislation terminating the lending powers of the RFC (Public
Law 163, 83rd Cong., July 80, 1953) also provided for the creation
of the Small Business Administration to make loans—including im-
mediate and deferred participation loans—to small business firms,
and to make disaster loans.
Federal financial aid to business firms, in contrast with that to
farmers and homeowners, has been extended almost entirely through
direct rather than federally sponsored agencies. The Federal Reserve
Banks are the only quasi-public agency involved; and although their
services as agents for various federal agencies in the Regulation V
and Defense Production Act programs were administratively im-
portant, loans to business from their own funds have been of
comparatively small volume. Chart 11 makes that plain, and shows
how the credit of the federal agencies lending to business was con-
centrated in a relatively few years: 1982—1935, 1942—
1947, and 1952—1953. Chart 12 shows the shifting importance of the
major agencies, with RFC supplying in 1932—1935 and during
World War II nearly two-thirds of the total disbursed, whereas in
1946 and 1947, and again in 1952—1953, the Export-Import Bank
accounted for upwards of three-fourths of the total.
The course of federal credit activities directed to the financial
sector of the economy (apart from Federal Reserve Bank credit
to member banks of the Federal Reserve System)3 has been uneven,
as Chart 18 shows. The first noteworthy phase was short-lived, being
restricted to the early 1930's. In this period RFC loans were made
on a large scale mainly to banks and insurance companies, primarily
to alleviate distress caused by depression conditions. Almost con-
currently, the RFC carried out a substantial program of stock pur-
chases in banks and insurance companies, and lesser programs of
the same type were directed to the financial assistance of savings and
loan associations by the T.Jnited States Treasury and, after 1934,
8Advancesto, and rediscounts for, member banks are not regarded as coming
within the scope of the present study because, as was pointed out in Chapter 1, in
connection with them the primary purpose of the Federal Reserve Banks is to
influence general credit conditions through changes in member bank reserve bal-
ances and not to provide a financing service in a sense comparable to what is
aimed at by the various agencies whose activities are included in our study.
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by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (the two combined account-
ing for about one-seventh of the associations' total capital invest-
ment in
In the second phase the principal activity consisted of lending
by the federally sponsored Federal Home Loan Banks to their mem-
ber institutions, mainly savings and loan associations. Quite in con-
trast to the programs of the early thirties, which had as their object
the support of faltering financial institutions, Home Loan Bank
loans to member institutions in recent years have served mainly to
enable prospering savings and loan associations .to increase their
lending activity during a period of general economic expansion.
Since 1950, federal assistance to financial institutions has consisted
exclusively of these loans by the Federal Home Loan Banks, now
almost altogether owned by their member associations.
Home Loan Bank lending ultimately affects the housing sector of
the economy and will be discussed in the next chapter. With no
other public or quasi-public agency currently extending credit to
financial institutions (apart from the excluded Federal Reserve
operations), the two following sections—on credit services and on
lending experience—will be limited to federal financial activities in
the field of business.
Services an1dCreditTerms
American business enterprises have traditionally made use of a
number of different credit services, for each of which there has ex-
isted one or more supplying institutions and a more or less well-
developed market. Among these services have been long-term loans,
usually secured by mortgage or pledge of real estate or securities
by the borrower; loans, running from one to ten years
to maturity, and either secured or unsecured; short-term loans of
less than one year's duration, usually unsecured and used principally
for the conduct of current operations; trade or mercantile cre4it,
obtained from suppliers and repayable within short periods of time.
In addition, American businesses have used a limited amount of
credit insurance, supplied by specialized underwriters and, in a
somewhat different form, by factoring and commercial financing
houses that purchase business accounts receivable without recourse.4
4 a description of these business credit services and markets as of around
1946, see Finance and Banking by Neil H. Jacoby and Raymond .J.
Saulnier (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program,
1947).
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CHART11.
Federal Credit for Business, 1918—1953
The task of comparing the credit services available through fed-
eral agencies with those customarily obtained from private financial
institutions is considerably simplified by the fact that public agencies
have confined their business credit activities preponderantly to lend-
ing on medium term and to the guaranty and insurance of such loans
made by private financial institutions. in this connection it may be
asked: What types of credit services have been provided and to what
types of businesses? What unusual or unique economic functions
have been served by federal credits to business? How have public and
private agencies cooperated in business credit activities?
In dealing with these questions, attention will be focused upon the
240
ofBUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
of dollars
CHART 11(concluded)
From Table A-5. For data on the components of the series, see Tables A-9, A-b,
A-12 to A-14, A-16, A-18, A-21, A-27, A-30, A-32, and A-33.
operationsof the five major federal agencies and one federally spon-
sored agency having active business credit programs in the early
1950's; namely, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,5 the Vet-
erans' Administration, the Export-Import Bank, the Maritime Ad-
5PublicLaw 163, 83rd Congress, enacted July 30, 1953, terminated all lending
powers of the RFC under Section 4 of the RFC Act as amended, effective Sep-
tember 28, 1953. Executive Order 10489 transferred all powers, duties and func-.
tions of RFC under the Defense Production Act of 1950 to the Secretary of the
Treasury, effective September 29, 1953.
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CHART12
Business Loans, Loan Guarantees, and Loan Insurance by Principal
Federal and FederaiJy Sponsored Agencies,1 932—] 953
From Tables A-5, A-9, A-b, A-16, A-lB, A-27, and A-30.
Total outstandings include, besides those of the federally sponsored Federal Re-
serve Banks and of the several direct federal agencies shown, those of the follow-
ing direct agencies: the Director General of Railroads and the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1932—1953; the War Finance Corporation in 1932—1934; the
Public Works Administrationin1 934—1 950; the Housing and Home Finance
Agency in1 95 0—1 953; the War and Navy Departments and U.S. Maritime Com-
mission (including Regulation V and defense production guarantees) in 1942—
1 953; the Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the
Atomic Energy Commission (guarantees under the Defense Production Act of
1950) in 195 1—1953. RFC totals include loans of the Smaller Wor Plants Corpo-
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Total volume covers, besides the agencies shown: the PWA:J933_J937; the
HHFA in 1950—1953; the Department of Defense in 1942—1953; the War and
Navy Departments and U.S. Maritime Commission in 1942—1946; and the De-
partment of Commerce, the GSA, and the AEC in 1951—1 953. RFC totals include
loans of the Smaller War Plants.Corporation for 1942 through 1946.
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ministration, the Small Business Administration,6 and the Federal
Reserve Banks.
These six agencies offered one or more of three types of credit
services, mainly within the medium-term credIt field:(1) direct
loans, (p2) guarantees of parts of loans made by private lending
institutions, and (3) insurance against loss on loans made by private
agencies. All except the VA have had power to lend money directly
to businesses. All of them have also been empowered to offer loan
guarantees by agreeing to take up a specified part (ranging up to
90 percent) of business loans made by banks or other private insti-
tutions upon default or upon demand by the private lenders con-
cerned. In addition, the Veterans' Administration has insured certain
private lenders against loss—up to the limits of a reserve fund built
up in a fashion similar to FHA Title I loan insurance reserves—
on small term loans made to eligible veterans for business purposes.
The volume of these various activities, and the outstanding amounts
of loans and loan insurance or guaranty extended under them, were
shown in Charts 11 and
The federal agencies have also acted as advisers and clearinghouses
of financial information for businesses, especially small firms, and
have provided stand-by sources of credit. For example, RFC received
and disposed of nearly 336,000 different inquiries from businesses
during a sixteen-month period ending October 31, 1947. Among
them 68,000 pertained to business loans and 197,000 to miscellaneous
matters, such as financial, management, engineering and accounting
advice, and RFC policies.7 In many instances RFC referred inquiries
to commercial banks or aided businessmen in framing their applica-
tions to commercial banks. In rendering such assistance and by serv-
ing as a potential source of credit the RFC, and other federal agencies
that have performed similar functions,8 undoubtedly exerted an im-
6 The Small Business Administration began operations in October 1953 in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Small Business Act of 1953 (Public Law
Therefore it seems appropriate to include it wherever possible in a discussion of
credit terms and policies, at the same time noting that its lending program—in
terms of loan disbursements—first became active in early 1954.
7 Hearing8 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
U.S. Senate, on S. Res. 132, "A Resolution for an Inquiry into the Operation of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Its Subsidiaries," Part 2, 80th Cong.,
2nd sess., January 1948, Exhibit 87, pp. 455ff.
8 One of the responsibilities delegated to the newly formed Small Business
Administration by the Congress was that of helping small business obtain com-
petent management, technical, and production counsel and also a fair share of
government procurement contracts. For a brief resume of progress under these
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portant indirect influence on the business credit market, wholly apart
from the loan funds disbursed or the insurance or guaranty commit-
ments made.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BUSINESSES SERVED
Indirect but significant evidence on the size of the businesses served
by federal credit programs is at hand in comparative data of loan
size. Excepting small business loans guaranteed or insured by the
Veterans' Administration, the loans made or protected by public
agencies have been predominantly of medium size. The average size
of bank term loans to business during 1946 was about In
contrast, loans disbursed by the RFC during 1934—1951 averaged
;'°Export-ImportBank loan authorizations over the same
period averaged more than $1 million;" the average amount of
Federal Reserve Bank industrial loans approved through 1950 was
$176,000 ;12andloans by the Smaller War Plants Corporation
(September through December 1945) averaged
Bank loans made with immediate or deferred participation by RFC
(that is, those authorized up to mid-1947) averaged $138,700.1.4
The concentration of federal activities in the field of medium-sized
loans is forcefully revealed in Table 44. Of commercial bank term
loans to business firms in 1946, less than one-tenth were for individual
amounts of to $500,000. But considerably larger fractions
of federal loans and guarantees were of that size—fractions ranging
from one-third for direct business'loans made by the RFC in 1934—
1951 to more than three-fifths of all business loans approved by the
Small Business Administration in the ten months to July 31, 1954.
programs through July 31, 1954 see the Second Semi-Annual Report of the Small
Business Administration, of that date, pp. 58ff.
9DuncanMcC. Hoithausen, "Term Lending to Business by Commercial Banks
in 1946," Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1947, Table 6, p. 505. During the year
ended November 20, 1946, an estimated 119,900 loans totaling $3,242 million were
made.
10Fromthe National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of direct
loans made under RFC's regular lending authority(i.e., apart from wartime
powers), reported in Appendix B (Table B-i).
11SemiannualReports of the bank.
12FederalReserve Bulletin, December 1951, p. 1541. Up to December 31, 1950,
3,698 applications had been approved for a total amount of $651,389,000.
13DouglasR. Fuller, Government Financing of Private Enterprise, Stanford
University Press, 1948, Table 6, p. 151.
14FromTable B-aG; based on the National Bureau of Economic Research com-
pilation of all RFC participation loans except those made under blanket par-
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These figures are impressive despite the imperfect comparability
of the different loan groups.15
Outside. the medium loan size range, differences between the public
credit institutions and the commercial banks were greater in the
small than in the large size ranges. Ninety percent of commercial
bank term loans were in amounts under The comparable
figure for the Small Business Administration was only 87 percent;
for RFC participations, 47 percent; for loans made solely by RFC,
65 percent. At the upper end of the size scale, the distribution by
amount shows commercial banks and RFC each with about half their
credit in loans of $1 million and over. The V-loan guarantee pro-
gram, geared to aid large key war industries, extended 90 percent of
its credit in amounts of $1 million or more; and virtually the entire
portfolios of the Export-Import Bank and the Maritime Administra-
tion also consisted of very large loans.
It may be concluded, then, that with the single exception of the
business loans guaranteed or insured by the Veterans' Administra-
tion—most of which were (for statutory reasons) concentrated
within the $1,000 to $5,000 size bracket18—federal credit services
have been directed to the middle ranges in the business-size spectrum.
They have not been instrumentalities predominantly for the financ-
ing, of small business. This conclusion is confirmed in the case of
RFC by an analysis of the size of business firms receiving credit
benefits, inclucle.d in Appendix B. By and large, federal agencies
have not found it feasible to make large' numbers of small loans to
small enterprises because of the high administrative costs per dollar
of credit extended which such operations entail.17
Compared with the medium-term credits' supplied by the com-
mercial banking system, those provided by federal agencies have
tended to be concentrated among manufacturing businesses. This
has been true of 'all federal programs with the exception of the
Veterans' Administration, which, being focused wholly on very
small ventures, has been concentrated among retail trade and service
i5 For instance, all the SBA loans and guarantees and many of the RFC direct
loans were made during the inflationary period from 1947 on, whereas the bank
loans, the RFC participations, and the V-loan guarantees stem 'partly or entirely
from earlier periods. V-loan data refer to number of borrowers rather than of
loans and are biased upward as to size.
See Appendix Table C-li for a distribution of VA-guaranteed business loans
made from May through October 1947 according to purchase price of assets ac-
quired with the loan proceeds.
17 See the testimony of an RFC official, footnote 59, Appendix B.
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businesses where small size is• characteristic.18 Table 45 presents
comparisons of RFC participation loans, RFC direct loans, Federal
Reserve Bank industrial loans, Small Business Administration loans,
and commercial bank term loans acc.ording to the industry of the
borrower involved. Manufacturing firms formed about 9 percent
of the total number of operating businesses in the United States in
1949. Yet as much as 60 percent of all RFC participation loans,
48 percent of RFC direct loans, and 57 percent of Federal Reserve
Bank loans and of Small Business Administration loans were made
to manufacturing enterprises; and in line with the special purpose
of the program, more than nine out of every ten V-loan guarantees
authorized from April to June 1946 applied to a manufacturing
credit.19 The majority of Export-Import Bank credits also went
to finance capital goods exports by American manufacturing firms,
even where the loan was made directly to a foreign government or
corporation. On the other hand, only 14.6 percent of commercial
bank term loans went to the manufacturing segment of business.
Retail trade and service firms—which comprise 64 percent of all
operating businesses in 1949—were numerically much more impor-
tant users of commercial bank term credit and comparatively unim-
portant users of the credit services of federal agencies.
One reason is that the risks of term lending have been, on the
average, greater with manufacturing than with trade, service, or
financial firms because the commitment to fixed assets is relatively
greater, the term to maturity of the required credit is longer, fluctua-
tions of profits are wider, and the impacts of technological changes
and economic fluctuations are more severe. A contributing factor
was the very severe erosion of working capital suffered by many
medium and small American manufacturing firms during the thirties.
As a result, proportionately more manufacturing firms have been
ultra-marginal to private lenders and have sought public credit.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT
Federal credit services appear to have exerted a pull on the
regional distribution of economic resources generally toward the
South Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coastal regions, and away from
the earlier-developed areas of the nation—New England, and the
18 See Appendix Table C-li for a distribution of VA-guaranteed business loans
made in 1949—1950 by industry of borrower.
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Middle Atlantic and East North Central states. The tendency of
federal business credit to finance firms in areas which are newly
industrialized and have gained most rapidly in population
and economic wealth during the past generation is evident not only
in RFC lending2° but also in Federal Reserve Bank industrial loans
(though not among privately made small business loans guaranteed
or insured by the Veterans' Administration). This may betoken a
relatively greater lack of private credit facilities in the regions of
most rapid growth; it may indicate the presence in these areas of
relatively more firms in new industries or other high risk situations.
At any rate, disproportionately large numbers of RFC and Federal
Reserve Bank loans to business were made in the capital deficit areas
of the nation, and disproportionately small numbers in the capital
surplus areas such as the New England, the Middle Atlantic, and
the East North Central regions.
TERMS TO MATURITY
Federal business credit agencies have functioned predominantly in
the medium-term market. At the inception, of their business lending
operations during the early thirties, RFC and the Federal Reserve
Banks made, or facilitated the making, of business loans with longer
maturities than were then commonly available from commercial
banks, life insurance companies, or other private lenders.21 After
1934 private lending agencies progressively entered the medium-
term business credit market; federal agencies appear to have con-
tinued to operate in the more lengthy segment of the market, but
this difference between public and private agencies is tending to
lessen.
Business loans guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration brought
the commercial banking system into a new type of credit operation,
namely term lending to new and very small firms. Whereas probably
more than three-quarters of the small business loans made by com-
mercial banks are written to mature within a year, virtually no
VA-guaranteed business loans have matured in less than ten months.22
20 See Appendix Table B-8, which compares the regional distribution of RFC
direct business loans disbursed in 1934—1951 with that of all business loans held
by commercial banks in 1941 and 1951 and of all operating businesses in 1948.
21 Cf. N. H. Jacoby and R. J. Saulnier, Term Lending to (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942), pp. 24f.
22 See Appendix Table C-12 for a comparison of maturity of distributions for
VA-guaranteed business loans and commercial bank term loans to small bus-
inesses. Appendix Table B-2 gives comparable data for RFC direct loans to
business concerns.
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Loans guaranteed under Regulation V had original maturities run-
fling over one year in about two-fifths of the cases,23 and the Export-
Import Bank has been concerned primarily with the provision of medi-
um-term credit, nearly 70 percent of the loans outstanding at the end
of 1958 having original maturities of ten years or less.24
CREDIT POLICIES
A basic policy of all federal agencies lending to business has been
to provide credit only to firms unable to procure it from the usual
sources on reasonable terms. The agencies interpreted this to mean
an inability on the part of the prospective borrower to obtain funds
at conventional rates from the commercial banks with which it
ordinarily dealt, and they have faithfully sought to making
loans that such commercial banks would make.25 This policy has
defined in part the class of business borrowers with which federal
agencies would deal—firms which were ultra-marginal credit risks
or which lacked local banking connections.
Federal statutes have embodied other credit standards as well.
The RFC statute required that loans should be "so secured or of such
sound value as reasonably to assure repayment," and in practice the
agency required that adequate collateral security be supplied. RFC
totally eschewed unsecured lending.26
Industrial advances by the Federal Reserve Banks were also re-
quired to be "on a reasonable and sound basis," and this was inter-
preted by most banks to mean full coilateralization. On V loans, the
commercial bank concerned ordinarily relied on the government con-
tract as collateral. Export-Import Bank loans usually involved
collateral or endorsement, and the Maritime Administration's ship
loans have been secured by first mortgages. By law, the Veterans'
Administration might guarantee or insure a small business loan to a
veteran only if the experience and ability of the veteran were such
that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that he would be successful,
28 Burr and Sette, op.cit., Table 18, p. 50.
24 Seventeenth Semiannual Report, Export-Import Bank of Washington, July—
December 1958, Appendix C.
25 RFC and Federal Reserve Banks did not insist that credit be "unavailable"
from other lenders than commercial banks, or from other commercial banks than
those in the applicant's community. Nor did they require the applicant to show
an inability to obtain equity funds.
26 See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., May 8 and 9, 1950, on 4 Study of the Operations of
the Reconstruction. Finance Corporation pursuant to S. Res. 219. Analysia of
Income and Coats, statement of Harvey L. Gunderson.
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and only if the purchase price paid by the veteran for business
property or for the cost of constructing such property did not
exceed "the reasonable value thereof" as determined by a VA-
designated appraiser.27 The law also requires that realty loans be
secured by a first mortgage, and that loans for machinery, equip-
ment, working capital, good will, or intangibles be secured by per-
sonalty "to the extent legal and practicable." It is clear that Con-
gress has intended that the normal banking measures be taken to
assure repayment or recovery of funds disbursed.
The question naturally arises: If loans by federal. agencies were
supposed to be sufficiently secured to assure repayment, why were
not the business enterprises using their services in a position to
satisfy their requirements from private sources? 'Why did they
come to federal agencies? One answer would seem to be that the
adequacy of security is a matter open to a wide range of judgments;
federal agencies were expected—and frequently were able—to take
a more liberal view of the value of collateral than could private
bankers.
Moreover, some firms which were unquestionably worthy of private
credit lacked local banking facilities altogether, or lacked facilities
that were adequate to their needs. A questionnaire mailed to more
than 15,000 commercial banks by the Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency investigating the RFC in
1947 brought forth these significant findings: Of the nearly 8,000
banks which responded, half reported that they had refused to make
some business loans which appeared to be sound credit risks.. Several
reasons were given, of which the most frequent were: the loan ex-
ceeded the bank's legal limit; the requested maturity was too long;
the bank lacked experience with the requested type of loan, or the
applicant was launching a new enterprise.28 Behind these reasons lay
the restrictions on risk assumption imposed by banking laws and
bank examining officers, and the need for liquidity imposed by the
slender capital resOurces and the high ratio of demand deposits
which characterize American banking. The inquiry indicated that
ordinarily RFC did not make types of loans that. banks were not
making; rather, it took higher risk loans than many banks could,
27 Veterans'Administration, Lenders' Handbook, December1948,supple-
mentary pp. 3.5f., citing 38 U.S.C. 694C.
28 Hearings .. onS. Res. 132, Part 1, 80th Cong., 1st. sess., December 1947,
pp. 258ff.
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or would, make.2° The same appears to have been true of the working
capital loans made by Federal Reserve Banks, the exporter credits
of the Export-Import Bank, and the ship purchase or construction
loans of the Maritime Administration. In the case of the Veterans'
Administration, the existence of loan guaranty or insurance, by re-
ducing exposure to risk of loss, doubtless induced many banks to
make loans they would not otherwise have made.
In his study of the operations of Export-Import Bank from 1934
through 1947, Marsh reached the conclusion that the bank had
faithfully followed the statutory injunction "not to compete with
private capital," and had financed export transactions for which
private credit was not available, either because of the high trading
risk or the high risk of inability to transfer funds from the foreign
buyer's country.3°
Another business credit policy apparently followed by most fed-
eral agencies was not to lend money primarily for the purpose of
enabling a firm to refund or repay other debts. Federal credit was
supposed to fulfill the primary purpose of financing new activity,
and not to bail out private credit institutions from loans of ques-
tionabie collectibility.31 Nevertheless, a material fraction of the funds
provided by federal business credit agencies was used to repay or
retire existing debt, sometimes in order to relieve a borrower's prop-
erty of prior liens so that the federal agency itself could obtain a
first lien. Thus, the proceeds of about one-fifth of RFC's direct
business loans, aggregating more than one-third of the funds dis-
bursed, were so utilized.32 Comparison with an analysis of the use
of the proceeds of commercial bank term loans to business firms
29Thisappears to have been the thought expressed by John D. Goodloe in
testimony as chairman of RFC before the Special Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency. He stated that apart from long-term credit
to small firms "we know of no important general classification [of business] that
is unable to private credit. However, there will always be a lack of credit
for concerns which fall within the lower level of desirability from the risk stand-
point." Cf. Hearings just cited, p. 35.
3°DonaldB. Marsh, The Export-Import Bank of Washington (Department of
Financial and Business Research, Chase National Bank of New York, mimeo.,
May 5, 1947), p. 43.
31Theofficial instructions of RFC to its loan agency managers stated: "Gen-
erally, a loan should not be made for the primary purpose of discharging an
existing indebtedness, except for the purpose of paying income taxes on a com-
promise basis. There may be circumstances, however, under which a reasonable
portion of a loan may be used for discharging an indebtedness, but no part should
be used to pay off a bank or other financial institution in liquidation or to reduce
existing indebtedness of slow or questionable nature."
32SeeAppendix Table B-3.
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outstanding June 30, 1941 indicates that RFC credits and private
term credit were used for about the same purposes.88
Proportionately more of federal credit has performed the func-
tion of financing new ventures than of private credit. It is estimated
that about one in seven of the direct business loans made by RFC
went to enterprises that were yet to be established at time of loan
authorization. Among these loans were such well-publicized venture
financing operations as Kaiser Steel Company, Carthage Hydrocol
Inc., and Lustron Corporation. RFC was also active in financing
firms in relatively new industries—including motor courts, cold stor-
age lockers, alfalfa dehydrators, and bottled gas—where private
credit was difficult to obtain because of the novelty of the industry
and the lack of data and experience for appraising risks. VA-
guaranteed business loans were, of course, entirely. for the purpose
of enabling veterans to establish or. expand their' own businesses.
Most veterans used the proceeds of loans to purchase going con-
cerns or to expand established ventures; about 3percent of the
proceeds of loans closed between Apriland October p25, 1947
were to start a business.34
CREDIT STANDARDS
in applying the sta'tutory credit policies, federal business credit
agencies have examined many more applications for loans, loan in-
surance, or loan guaranty than they have approved. Over the period
1934 to mid-1951, ]IFC received about 88,000 applications for busi-
ness loans (covering both direct loans and participation loans ex-
clusive of blanket participation agreements), of which it approved
about 47,000, or 53 percent. The percentage of approvals to ap-
plications received rose as high as 74 percent during the first war
year, and fell as low, as 41 percent during 1949, reflecting
variations in economic conditions, in the percentage of applications
withdrawn, and in RFC's policy regarding acceptance of applica-
tions, as well as variations in the rigor with which applications were
scrutinized.35 Up to May 31, 1940, Federal Reserve Banks had ap-
proved only p2,900 or 30 percent of the 9,590. applications for busi-
ness loans received by them.86
Cf. N. H. Jacoby and R. J. Saulnier, Term Lending to pp.51f.
84 See Appendix Table C-15. 35 From material supplied by the RFC.
86 Charles L. Merwin, Jr. and Charles H. Schmidt, Capital and Credit Require-
ments of Federal Reserve Bank Industrial Loau Applicants (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Financial Research Program, mimed., 1942), Tables A-2 and
A-B, pp. A-3 and A-li.
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in examining the differences in financial characteristics between
samples of approved and rejected loan applicants for Federal Re-
serve Bank loans, Merwin and Schmidt found that the approved
applicants ran larger in asset size, were more heavily weighted by
manufacturing concerns, were somewhat more profitable (or less
unprofitable), and were somewhat less indebted than were the re-
jected applicants.37 Trends in financial ratios were less favorable
for the rejected than for the approved applicants. This appears to
indicate that the primary reason for rejecting applications was
failure of the applicant to meet minimal financial standards of the
Federal Reserve Banks; not availability of private credit, or other
reasons. Systematic information as to why RFC, VA, and other
federal agencies declined applications, for credit servicesisnot
available, but scattered evidence suggests that failure to meet the
credit standards of the public agency was predominant. Data on
small sample of applications rejected by RFC, for example, reveal
that "insufficient collateral," "earning ability not demonstrated,"
"excessive debt retirement," "inexperienced management," "insuf-
ficient equity investment," and "promotional venture" were the rea-
Sons most frequently assigned.88
The financial trends and ratios of firms borrowing from RFC are
known from a sample of the loans; and although comparable data
for commercial bank term loans are lacking,39 some inferences as to
comparative credit standards may be drawn. Nearly half of the
RFC loans were made to businesses whose current ratio (current
assets/current liabilities) in the fiscal year preceding the date of
loan application was less than the two-to-one standard generally
regarded as minimal by commercial banks. Moreover, a fifth of the
number and about one-third of the amount of RFC loans went to
firms with a net-worth-to-debt ratio of less than one-to-one, whereas
the average ratio for American business as a whole is about two-to-
one.4° Finally, about two-thirds of the number and amount of loans
went to firms rated "good" or "fair" by Dun and Bradstreet, while
Ibid., p. 8.
88 Hearings ... on.S. Res. 132, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., January 1948, p. 459.
89 The publications of Robert Morris Associates contain aggregates and averages
of information about financial ratios and trends of samples of firms submitting
their financial statements to commercial banks, but the statistics are not in a form
which facilitates comparison with federal agency credit standards.
40 Based on a distribution in which nearly 20 percent of the loans went to firms
failing to report financial data of this type. Many of these doubtless had low net-
worth-to-debt ratios. See Appendix Table B-b.
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relatively few loans were made to firms rated "high." The conclusion
appears justified that the preponderance of borrowers from RFC
were at, or under, the margin of creditworthiness, when judged by
the ordinary standards of commercial banks.
COOPERATIVE CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS
Part of the effort of public agencies to avoid competition with
private credit institutions and to accelerate the flow of credit to
business firmshas taken the form of cooperative credit relationships.
RFC policy was consistently directed toward inducing commercial
banks to make business loans by its readiness to enter into immediate
or deferred participations. In immediate participations, RFC and a
commercial bank each advanced a specified part of the funds under
a single loan agreement initiated by either lender. In deferred par-
ticipations, a bank advanced the total amount of a loan from its own
funds, and the RFC agreed to "take up," i.e. to purchase, a specified
percentage of the loan upon demand by the bank, in effect guar-
anteeing to the bank repayment of that portion of the loan. Federal
Reserve Banks have entered into similar cooperative arrangements
with commercial banks.
The Export-Import Bank and commercial banks have cooperated
in several ways. Export-Import Bank has supplied "supplementary
credits," in which both it and a commercial bank have lent money to
the same exporter; it has at all times made its current portfolio of
loans available for purchase by private investors; commercial banks
have participated in numerous credits arranged by it;finally,
"agency agreements" have been made with commercial banks en-
gaged in financing exports, whereunder the Export-Import Bank has
agreed to "take out" or reimburse the lending bank for a specified
proportion of the credit on demand—essentially a deferred participa-
tion or loan guarantee. Commercial bank credits disbursed at Ex-
port-Import Bank risk under agency agreements represented about
19 percent of the total of EIB loans and guarantees made from
February1934 to December 31,
The V-loan program and the business credit activities of the Vet-
erans' Administration were, of course, entirely cooperative in charac-
ter. Material on the characteristics of business loans made with RFC
participation, of those made cooperatively by Federal Reserve
41Cf.Marsh, op.cit.,pp. 44—47.
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Banks, and of those guaranteed under Regulation V and under the
VA program, follows.
Of the 47,000 business loans separately authorized by RFC under
its regular and wartime powers from 1934 to mid-1951, some 15,100,
or nearly one-third, involved cooperation with commercial banks.
Another 11,100 participation loans were authorized under Blanket
Participation Agreements arranged during the reconversion years
1945 and 1946. Our information on loan and borrower character-
istics concerns mainly the ordinary (rather than the BPA) par-
ticipations.
A study of the approximately 6,000 ordinary participation loans
authorized during the thirteen years from 1934 through mid-1947
(a period for which information on the participating banks was
readily available)—involving gross loan amounts of about
million for p2,018 different commercial banks—revealed these salient
facts :42
1.The great majority of participations carried a deferred rather
than an immediate commitment.
More participation loans involved an RFC risk of 75 percent
of the total loan than any other percentage. The volume of par-
ticipation lending would probably have been much less if RFC had
not been the major partner in carrying the risks.
3.Participation loans were preponderantly of medium and large
size; they averaged larger than loans made by RFC on its own ac-
count, and much larger than the term loans made by banks without
participation. Clearly, they were not a device for financing small
business.
4. The industrial and regional distributions of participation loans
resembled those of direêt RFC loans.
5. The banks which utilized participation facilities tended to be
well-established institutions of medium and large size, with national
charters or Federal Reserve membership, located in medium ,and
large-sized cities. About one-eighth of the banks in the nation were
involved. Participation was demonstrably not a measure utilized
principally by smailbanks in small communities to aid in the meeting
of local credit demands.
6.There was a considerable measure of concentration in the use
of participation facilities: a third of the number and half of the
42SeeAppendix B for supporting tabular material and a more detailed treat-
ment of the findings.
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amount of loans authorized from through mid-1947 involved
RFC participations with only 99 banks. On the other hand, more than
half the banks that participated with RFC did so on only one occa-
sion.
7.Because a quarter of the number of all participation loans
were in amounts which exceeded the legal loan limit of the creditor
bank, one may infer that an important motivation for banks in seek-
ingRFC guarantees was the opportunity, when most of the risk on a
business loan could be shifted to a public agency by paying a rela-
tively small fee, to make larger loans than the regulatory laws or
prudent bank management policies of asset diversification would
otherwise permit.
The most important post-World War II venture of public agencies
into the guaranteeing or insuring of business loans for commercial
banks was the blanket participation (BPA) program, begun by
RFC in March 1945 in an effort to provide ample reconversion
credit and to forestall anticipated mass unemployment. A commercial
bank that negotiated a blanket agreement with RFC was, in effect,
automatically assured of a deferred participation by RFC of up
to 75 percent of the amount of any business loan conforming to the
statutory restrictions on RFC loans. Under guarantees the
volume of RFC participations greatly expanded. the first time,
federal guaranty reached banks in small communities,43 and em-
braced loans of smaller average amount than had been made under
ordinary participation arrangements, although they were not by
any means small loans.44 BPA demonstrated the potentialities of a
streamlined governmental underwriting of business credit risks, and
suggested some of the dangers as well, coming under criticism as an
untimely stimulus to credit and an encouragement to loose lending
practices. The program. was withdrawn in January 1947.
With respect to a considerable proportion of regular participa-
tion loans, it appears that RFC functioned as a risk-distributing
agency for banks of medium size. In an economy increasingly charac-
terized by large enterprises with large credit requirements, and
where the dominant pattern of banking is one of. small-scale institu-
tions with limited capital resources, it was perhaps natural that
RFC participation should take on that emphasis. Partly to meet the
problem of limiting the exposure to risk of loss for an individual
48 See Appendix Table B-49.
44 See Appendix Table B-48.
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bank in meeting the credit demands of its area, commercial banks
have developed an intricate set of correspondent relationships.
mercial bankers have contended that the correspondent banking sys-
tem is an instrumentality capable of solving the problem of diversifi-
cation of risks, and that a public credit agency for the purpose is
unnecessary.
The preceding description of RFC. participation credits and of
the banks involved appears to apply in its major outlines to the
participation loans made by Federal Reserve Banks. More than half
of the number and two-thirds of the amount of Federal Reserve Bank.
loans and guarantee commitments to business represented loans
made cooperatively with commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions. In the majority of the loans, the commercial bank assumed be-
tween and50 percent of the liability for loss. Cooperative loans
averaged larger in amount than the loans made by the Federal Reserve
Banks alone. Each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks was delegated
authority to pass upon the creditworthiness of applicants and to work
out the terms of its loans, subject only to broad regulations laid down
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Hence
there were material variations between Federal Reserve districts in the
use of cooperative arrangements. On the whole, experience with co-
operative loans proved somewhat better than with loans made solely
by the Reserve Banks—a conclusion which might have been expected.
Measured b.y the volume of funds involved, the most extensive fed-•
eral program of business loan guaranty was the V-loan program of
World War The armed services were authorized to guarantee
loans made by private financial institutions to meet the working
capital needs of businesses engaged in war production either as con-
tractors or subcontractors; and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System established a procedure under Regulation V.
by which the twelve Federal Reserve Banks administered the guar-
antees, as agents for the War and Navy Departments and the U.S.
Maritime Commission. The purpose was to assure an adequate flow
of credit to finance war production. Extensions of the regulation to
apply to working capital needs as contracts terminated have already
been described. Regulation V originally established a maximum in-
terest rate of 5 percent on the loans to be guaranteed, which was
reduced in September 1944 to 4½ percent. It provided for a maxi-
45Cf.Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1946, pp. 240—248; also Burr and Sette,
op.cit., pp. 7ff.
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mum guarantee of 90 percent, except in unusual cases, and the
lending institution was charged a fee graduated upward as the
guaranteed portion of the loan increased.
Authorizations under Regulation V from April 1942 to June 1946
totaled about $10.5 billion.48 Most were revolving credits, so that
although some authorizations were never disbursed but functioned
as standby credits, others were used many times over, and the total
of disbursements reached $12 billion. Some part of the credit un-
doubtedly would have been advanced without federal guarantee,
because commercial banks shifted a material part of their lending
for war purposes from an unguaranteed to a guaranteed basis after
Regulation V was promulgated.47 Even when guaranteed credit was
at its peak, it represented only about two-thirds of all bank credit
for war purposes, the banks having carried the. risk of the other
one-third themselves.
The concentration of V-loan guarantees with large banks was
quite pronounced: only 10 percent of all commercial banks took
part, and nearly all of them were of medium or large size.48 In fact,
98 of all banks with deposits of $50 million or over, and 78
percent of those with deposits of $10 to $50 million had loans guar-
under Regulation V, as against only 1 percent of the banks
with deposits of under $1 million and 6 percent of those with de-
posits of. from $1 to $2 million. The V-loan guarantee program
bypassed the small bank, just as it bypassed small businesses.
Bbth in statutory conception and in actual operation, the business
loan guaranty program of the Veterans' Administration has had a
markedly different character from other federal.programsof
guaranty or insurance. The salient distinctions may be summarized
as follows:
1.Unlike other federal business loan guaranteeing agencies, VA
lacked. the power to lend directly to business.
2. VA enforced no requirement that the borrower show unavail-
ability of nonguaranteed credit from private sources, whereas other
public agencies made the granting of credit or credit guaranty con-
tingent upon a showing that the prospective borrowing business had
been unable to obtain credit on reasonable terms from private
sources.
3.Other federal business credit programs have been restricted to
46 Burr and Sette, op.cit., Table 2, p. 14.
4T Ibid., p. 19. 48 Ibid., Table 20, p. 52.
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established or solvent firms, to firms engaged in exporting or some
specified type of economic activity, or—as in the case of Federal
Reserve Bank industrial loans—to the financing of working capital
needs; but VA loans have been unrestricted in all these respects.
4. VA was forbidden by law to charge for its guaranty service
on business credits, and the loans it could guarantee were held to a
maximum interest rate (5.7 percent per annum for insured non-real-
estate loans) that is iow in relation to the high risks and administrá-
tive costs involved. Other federal business credit agencies have had
broad administrative powers to determine charges for credit services
(though in practice they have tended to standardize 'rates without
distinction among borrowers and to vary rates rather infrequently
through time).
5. VA guarantees have been limited to very small amounts—SO
percent of the amount of a loan but not more than in the case
of loans not secured by real estate, or $4,000 in the case of real-
estate-secured loans—whereas other public agencies have usually
been permitted to make, guarantee, or insure loans of any amount.
6.The VA program has been more decentralized than that of any
other public agency. More than seventy regional offices were operated
at one time, each with power to approve loans finally for guaranty or
insurance.
VA-guaranteed business loans have been preponderantly amor-
tized term loans to very small firms. They averaged under $3,000
in amount, with an average VA liability of approximately
They had a modal term to maturity of .two and one-half to three
years, and were amortized in equal monthly installments.50 Nearly
three-quarters of the loans closed during June and July 1947 were
secured by liens on personal property employed in the business.51
Measured against private credit to businesses of fairly small
size, VA guarantees appear quantitatively unimportant. From 1945
to December 1954, loans, in an aggregate original amount
of $588 million, had been disbursed; and about 57,000 loans, with
balances estimated between $100 million and $150 million, were out-
standing.52 The number of "small business" loans held by Federal
49 Loan Veterans' Administration, December 1954, p. 57.
50 From Appendix Table C-12, which gives the maturity distribution of ,loans
made between May and August 1947, and Table C-14, which gives the repayment
schedule for loans closed in June and July 1947.
51 See Appendix Table C-13.
52 Compiled from data in Loam Guaranty, Veterans' Administration, December
1954, p. 57.
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Reserve member banks in November 1946 is estimated .at 514,000,
andthe amount outstanding, at $2.9 billion.53 Yet \A guarantees
might bulk large if they could be compared solely with private credit
to similar borrowers: that is, new and extremely small firms. Their
importance lies in the introduction of term lending into that market,
and in inducing commercial banks to undertake and gain experience
with such loans.
PRICING OF CREDIT SERVICES
The pricing policies of federal business credit agencies contrast
with those of private-lending institutions in certain distinctive char-
acteristics. There has been evident, in the first place, a strong
tendency to standardize the interest rate or fee charged
within each broad class of loans rather than to discriminate between
borrowers and loans according to size, credit risk, and costs of loan
administration. Secondly, there has been a tendency toward in-
flexibility of charges through time, instead of sensitive and frequent
adjustment to changing supply-demand conditions in the money
markets. Thirdly, the. pricing policy has tended to consider only
partial costs, with interest rates and commitment fees in many in-
stances insufficient to defray the full cost of supplying the credit
services if the cost of capital funds employed is included. Fourthly,
in loan guaranty and insurance programs congressional as well as
administrative actions have operated in the direction of reducing
charges for business credit by private lending institutions, frequently
below current market rates.
RFC, whose statute did not prescribe its customer charges, set a
standard 5 percent rate on direct loans or immediate participations
in 1935. This was reduced to 4 percent on April 1, 1939 and restored
to the 5 percent rate on November 10, 1950, apparently in response
to criticism that full costs were not being met. RFC's loan guarantee
fees were originally graduated from 1/2 percent to about 2 percent,
depending on duration; were shifted upward, then downward, and on
November 10, 1950 were raised to a flat 2 percent.
Each Federal Reserve Bank has fixed its own rate for industrial
loans and commitments, subject to approval by the Board of Gov-
53 "Member Bank Loans to Small Business," by Charles H. Schmidt, Federal
Re8erve Bulletin, August 1947, p. 963. In the survey, the definition of small busi-
ness covers manufacturing and mining firms with total assets of less than $750,000,
wholesaletrade concerns with assets under $250,000, and all other firms with assets
under $50,000.
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ernors of the Federal Reserve System. At the beginning, five of. the
banks announced a standard loan rate of 6 percent, one bank an-
nounced a standard rate of 51/2 percent, and the remaining banks
published rates varying 4 to 6 or 5to6 percent.54 Later the
different banks tended to abandon the standard rate and to move
toward a range of rates, until at the end of 1954 the published range
of rates on loans was p21/2 to 5percentand S½to5 percent for all
banks excepting St. Louis, for which it was 3 to 5 percent and
Atlanta and Kansas City, where it was p23/4to5percent.The range
of rates on loan the end of 1954 was ½to11/4 percent
or ½to1% percent per annum of the amount of the Reserve Bank's
commitment.55 Despite these changes in pricing policy, recent charges
only partially reflect the variation of individual loan risks and costs.
As with RFC, changes in Federal Reserve Bank rates through time
have been comparatively infrequent.
Congress fixed a maximum annual interest rate of 4 percent on
business loans eligible for guarantee by the Veterans' Administra-
tion,5° and a maximum rate of 5.7 percent on insured loans not
secured by real estate—rates demonstrably below the competitive
rate for loans of similar risk and administrative cost. It did not
authorize the VA to make any charge whatever for business loan
guaranty or insurance, so that these services represent an outright
subsidy to the veteran borrower.
For Regulation V loans the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System limited the interest rate that could be charged by
the lender to 5 percent and established a definite scale of charges to
be made by Federal Reserve Banks fqr entering into contracts of
loan guarantee.S? The scale was altered twice. After September 11,
1944, the Reserve Banks were required to charge a fee of 10 percent
of the total interest collected on a loan, when the percentage of the
loan guaranteed was 60 percent or less. As the percentage of the
54 Banking and Monetary Stati8tics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1943, Table 118, p. 446.
55 Federal Reserve Bntle tin, January 1955, p. 27.
56 Congress amended the law effective August 10, 1948, to permit the Adminis-
trator, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury, to approve of rates
up to 41/2 percent. Effective May 5, 1953 the Veterans' Administration, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, authorized an increase in the maximum
interest rate to 41./2 percent per annum.
ST Burr and Sette, op.cit., pp. 4Sf. The Reserve Board also limited the commit-
ment fees that banks were permitted to charge business firms on the undisbursed
portions of loans authorized by them.
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loan covered by the guarantee rose, the fee ranged upward to a
maximum of 50 percent of the interest charge when the fraction of
the loan guaranteed was over 95 percent. The scale was applicable
to all loans, irrespective of size, credit risk, or administrative costs.
Congress has fixed the maximum rate chargeable on ship construc-
tion loans by the Maritime Administration at percentif the
ship is to be used in foreign trade, and at 51/4 percent if in domestic
trade. For its insurance of ship mortgage loans made by private
lenders the agency has fixed a premium of betweenpercent and 1
percent per annum of the insured amount of the loan.
Among the federal sources of business credit only the Export-
Import Bank appears to have adopted a flexible interest rate policy.
This was a matter of administrative decision; Congress left the
bank's management free to establish its own scale of charges. Most
loans to foreign governments have carried rates ranging from
to3½percentper annum; loans to foreign or domestic business
enterprises have, been made at rates in the range of 4 to 5percent;
special exporter-importer credits have been extended at 6 percent.58
The implications of the standard loan rate policy followed by
federal business credit agencies have received much attention from
congressional committees and others. RFC's policy was examined
intensively by a Senate subcommittee'in 1947 at which time officers
of the corporation testified that distinctions in rates as between sizes,
maturities, and risk qualities were impractical.59 The committee's
report suggested that the managers of local RFC loan agencies, con-
sulting their advisory committees of bankers and businessmen, should
be free to set loan rates in the light of local conditions and without
required adherence to a national standard rate.
The RFC standard loan rate policy was again examined in 1950
by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency which demonstrated the inverse relationship between lending
costs and size of loan, which meant that at the standard rate, then
4 percent, the income from a relatively few large loans made up the
losses on many smaller loans.60 The corporation's loan rate policy
was at variance, of course, with the customary practices of com-
mercial banks, as is shown by comparison of average bank rates on
ssTwelfthSemiann'ual Report to Congress, Export-Import Bank of Washington,
January—June 1951, Appendix C, pp. 32—54.
5° Hearings ... onS. Res. 132, Part 1, 80th Cong., 1st sess., December 1947, p. 65.
60 Analysis of Income and Costs (cited in footnote 26), p. 71.
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business loans of different sizes with the RFC rate as of November
i946.6'
implication of the comparatively inflexible interest rate
policy of federal lending agencies is that public credit tended to
become relatively more attractive during periods of economic ex-
pansion, when interest rates would tend to be rising. The opposite
would be the case during periods of credit contraction. Thus the
federal policy had a tendency of producing a perverse cyclical effect.
Effective coordination of federal lending operations with over-all
fiscal and monetary policies for economic stability would seem to
imply a more flexible loan rate policy than that typically followed
by federal agencies.
Credit Experience
With the exception of the Export-Import Bank, the default ex-
perience and loss experience of federal lending and loan guaranteeing
programs for business have been unfavorable in comparison with
those of private business credit institutions. However, this result
was to be expected in view of the relatively high-risk financing in
which federal agencies have engaged, and does not necessarily reflect
adversely on the management of the programs. Certain of the ac-
tivities for which Congress made the public agencies responsible
were destined from the beginning to result in appreciable losses, a
fact that should be kept in mind in appraising the credit experience
of the public agencies.
It is important also to recognize the character of the economic
environment in which the programs functioned and its relation to
their default and loss experience.. Economic expansion over most of
the thirties and forties made many credits good which under depressed
or even stable economic conditions would have resulted in losses. The
experience records available to us fall within an unusually favorable
period, from the mid-thirties to the early fifties. It would be an
egregious error to regard that experience as characteristic of federal
business credit agencies in all time and under all conditions.
DEFAULT RATIOS
Evidence on the extent of delinquency among active loans in the
portfolios of federal agencies supplying credit service to business
refers mainly to loans made after World War II. At the end of 1951
61SeeAppendix Table B-51.
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about 87 percent of the number and 90 percent of the amount of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation's active business loans (about
four-fifths of which dated from 1948 or later) were "in good stand-
ing"; the remainder were delinquent in some respect.62 This record
cannot be compared directly withthe experience of commercial banks
with term loans, but it is known that during 1951 less than 1 percent
of the bank loans of all types appraised by bank examiners were classi-
fied as "substandard" in quality.63 It would seem •to follow the
RFC loans were of distinctly lower quality than those held by com-
mercial banks.
Estimated default ratios (ratios of the number and amount of
loans delinquent to the number and amount of active loans) for the
RFC direct business loan portfolio at the end of 1951, by size of
loan, term to maturity, size of borrower, industry of borrower,
region of borrower, year borrowing firm was established, arid prin-
cipal use of proceeds are shown in Appendix Tables B-12 to B-14.
Loan size appears to have had little relation to default experience,
but it is interesting to observe that defaults were less frequent among
the loans with longer maturities than among those made for shorter
periods, possibly because the former were more conveniently related
to the, capacity of the borrowing firm to make repayments. By and
large, the differences in delinquency ratios among various categories
of loans were not marked. Higher than average default ratios were
found for (1) loans with maturities of less than five years; (p2) loans.
used principally to increase working capital or to retire debt; (3)
loans to firms in the transportation, communications, and public utili-
ties group; (4) to firms. in the South.Atlantic, East South Central,
and Mountain regions; and (5)tofirms with declining sales or profit
trends. Loans to businesses in most asset-size classes under the
level had less than' average delinquency, the ratio for
businesses just forming at time of loan or too young to show three-
year financial trends was about average. The absence, in general,
of marked differences in delinquency ratios is an interesting phe-
nomenon, suggesting that RFC's credit standards were consistently
applied to all groups of loans.
62 Based on the National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of RFC
direct business loans exclusive of participations and national defense loans. For
details, see Appendix Tables B-il through B-16 and accompanying text.
63 Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance CorporatiOn, December 31,
1951, Table 108, p. 154.
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For business loans guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration,
default ratios over the period 1946—1954 ranged from 1.4 percent















a Loans in default at year end plus cases for which claim payments were pend-
ing, as percentage of all active loans. From Appendix Table C-8.
In connection with the rise in the ratios from 1951 to 1954, the in-
crease and then decrease in number of outstandings, exerting a
downward and then heightening. effect on the default ratio, should
be borne in mind. We lack corresponding measures to make a com-
parison with non-VA-guaranteed commercial bank loans tO businesses
of comparably small size.
FREQUENCY OF LOSS
The frequency and the severity of loss are more important, of
course, than the incidence of default in the description of loan ex-
perience. It is of interest to examine, first, the proportions of all
loans extinguished which resulted in some loss to the agency and,
secondly, to consider the ratio of the amount of realized net loss
to the amount disbursed on extinguished loans.
It is estimated that RFC, from 1934 to the end of 1951, extin-
guished 9.3 percent of its business loans with some loss.64 Loss fre-
quency was distinctly high with loans to firms in the transportation,
communications, and public utilities group (a result in which loans
during 1945 and 1946 to small trucking enterprises played a large
part); with loans in the Mountain and East South. Central regions
64 The figure refers to loans made under regular lending powers (i.e.
national defense loans and loans made in participation with private lenders are
excluded).
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and in the territorial possessions; with loans used principally to
purchase land or buildings or to purchase equipment; and with loans
to firms just organizing at time of application and those too young
to show three-year trends in financial condition.65
Among the VA-guaranteed small loans made after 1944 to veterans
establishing or expanding a business, 7.5 percent of those extin-
guished by the end of 1954 were loss loans—that is, terminated with
payment by VA of a claim by the private lending institution that
made the loan.66 The ratio had trended downward from about 15
percent in the early years.87
Information is available on Federal Reserve Bank loss experience
with business loans up to December 31, 1940, by which time the great
majority of the loans had been made. Funds had been on
loans, of which 1,1392 were participations with commercial banks
and other private financial institutions and 895 were made independ-
ently by the Federal Reserve Banks. In the first group losses were
charged off,. or provided for, on 4 percent of the total number; in the
second group, on 6 percent. Federal Reserve Bank experience was thus
more favorable than RFC's with respect to the relative frequency of
loss; but undoubtedly (although documentation is lacking) both were
unfavorable in comparison to commercial bank term lending.
It was to be expected that losses on loans guaranteed under Regu-
lation V would .be relatively small, because the government was the
principal customer of the borrowing enterprises as well as the
guarantor of their loans. Yet a number of "distress cases" arose,
mainly as a result of problems such as poor management or high
costs, and in a few cases because of unexpected contract cancella-
tions. Some of the distress loans were liquidated through the joint
elrorts of the originating commercial bank and the Federal Reserve
Bank of its district; yet 157 loans, totaling $66 million, were pur-
chased by the Federal R.eserve Banks as agents for the procurement
agencies in fulfillment of their guarantees.°8 The loss loans numbered
about 1.8 percent of all loans extinguished, and were of smaller
average size than other V loans. Among industry groups of loans,
those to manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft parts had a rela-
tively poor record.
65 See Appendix Tables B-24 through B29.
oe UpDecember 25, 1954, 149,021 loans had been paid in full and 12,128 loans
terminated by payment of a claim, for a total of 161,149 loans extinguished. See
Loan G'ua'ranty, Veterans' Administration, December 1954, p. 57.
87 See Appendix Tables C-7 and C-9. 68 Burr and Sette, op.eit., p. 57.
269BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
No losses had been realized up to the end of 1951 on the compara-
tively few ship purchase and construction loans held by the Maritime
Administration, although several loans were delinquent at that date.
Willingness, under the broad purpose of advancing the merchant
marine, to extend or renew loans not in current status may partly
explain the favorable record, but on that aspect are lacking.
EXTENT OF LOSS ON EXTINGUISHED LOANS
We turn to records of the amount of realized losses on extinguishe.d
loans. It is estimated that up to the end of 1951 the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation's loss ratio slightly exceeded 2 percent, which
is to so.y that the corporation lost two cents on every dollar of funds
disbursed on all business loans extinguished by that date.69. Com-
parable figures for commercial bank term loans are unavailable, but
insured banks reported losses, charge-offs, and transfers to reserve
accounts in 1951 amounting to less than one-half of 1 percent of
loans discounts of all types that were outstanding at the end
of that year; which, since the weighted average maturity of the
loans was probably under two years, implies a maximum loss of less
than 1 percent of the amount extinguished during the year.7°
RFC losses from the amount advanced on loans extinguished before
appear to have been heaviest on loans to very small firms (with
total assets under to businesses just organizing at time
of'loan; to manufacturing firms in the petroleum, coal, chemicals,
rubber group; and to firms in the Mountain region and the terri-
torial possessions.7'
The full amount of the l6sses realized on the small business loans
guaranteed by the Veterans' Administration is not accurately known,
because VA collects no data on the aggregate amount of repay-
ments made by debtors nor on the lender's total loss, but accounts
only for that part of the loss which was compensated by govern-
mental guaranty or insurance. Up to December 1954, VA had
69 From the National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey of RFC
direct business loans made under regular lending powers (i.e. excluding participa-
tion loans and national defense loans); see Appendix B, page B-97.
The Controller of RFC in 1950 estimated a higher loss ratio, about three cents
on each dollar of investment, probably referring to loans inclusive of those made
under wartime powers. See Analyais of Income and Costs (cited in footnote 26
above), pp.. 86 and 92.
7°AnwualReport of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1951, pp. 154
and 162,
SeeAppendix Tables B-33 to B-85.
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paid lenders' claims in the amount of $9,653,000, equal to 2.7 percent
of the total original amount of loans that had been repaid in full
or 1.6 percent of the total principal amount of all the loans guar-
anteed or insured to that date.12 For RFC, estimated losses through
1951 in ratio to the amount of all business loans made were 1.3
percent,73 a figure difficult to compare with the 1.6 percent for VA
because the latter covers only the compensated portion of the total
loss on the loans, because more of the credit extended under VA
guarantee than of that advanced by RFC up to the given dates was
still of unknown outcome, and for other reasons.
Like the RFC and VA business loan programs, the Federal
Reserve Banks also produced losses of larger amount than are ordi-
narily encountered in private banking activities. According to an
unpublished study by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, estimated net losses were approximately $1.9 million through
1951. Thus realized losses approximated 0.6 percent of the amount
loaned through 1951 and as much as 3 percent of the amount loaned
during 1934—1940, when loans were most numerous and were more
in the nature of a credit aid to businesses generally than were the
fewer, large loans made during and after the war. The FRB loss ratio
on loans made through 1951 is below that for RFC (0.6 as against
1.3 percent) ; the fact that participation loans (with a comparatively
good record as among the FRB loans) are covered in the ratio for
the Reserve Banks but not for RFC may partly explain the dif-
ference. Extensive losses on certain large loans are the chief factor
in the loss ratio for the FRB program. The record apparently varied
considerably among the different reserve districts; losses on loans
appear to have been comparatively heavy in those—such as New
York, San Francisco, and Richmond—where the business lending
programs were most active.74 It should be reiterated that the infla-
tionary boom of the forties affected the outcome of loans made then,
and for earlier loss loans brought substantial recoveries, so that in
more normal conditions the record would have been less favorable.
At the end of 1940 the amount of money set aside by the Reserve
72 Loan Guaramty, Veterans' Administration, December 1954, p. 57.
73 Appendix Table B-33.
74 an unpublished study, "18b Loan Program of the Federal Reserve
System, 1984-40," by Caroline H. Cagle, Division of Research and Statistics,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; also "The Industrial Loans
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York," by Robert V. Rosa: unpublished
address to the Sixth Annual Convention of the National Conference of Corn-
mercial Receivables Companies, October 17, 1950.
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Banks as provision against business lending losses, together with
amounts already charged off, approximated 5percentof the credit
advanced up to that date.
The loss ratios on loans guaranteed under Regulation V have
been almost infinitesimal, owing to the unusual circumstances under
which the guarantees were extended. By the end of 1949 the uncol-
lected balance of loans purchased from commercial banks by the
federal procurement agencies pursuant to their guarantees had been
reduced to about $6 million. Guarantee agreements covering an ad-
ditional $800,000 of loan balances were still outstanding on that
date. It has been estimated that losses on the entire program will
be about 0.06 percent of aggregate loan authorizations, and about
0.4 percent of the peak amount of guaranteed V-loan credit out-
standing ($1.8 billion at the end of July
Upto June1954 the Export-Import Bank reported losses of
$496,068, representing less than 0.1 percent of cumulative gross
income, and 0.01 percent of the total amount disbursed under all
authorizations, since the establishment of the bank in
REVENUES, COSTS, AND OPERATING RESULTS
A general picture of the operating results of federal business credit
programs is difficult to form because information on the largest of
them—that of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation—is deficient.
The statements published by the agency itself relate to its com-
bined programs for housing, railroads, and other segments of the
economy as well as business, and the underlying accounts do not per-
mit precise calculations for the business program alone. Moreover,
they require adjustment to reflect operating results from the stand-
point of the public: that is, to include the cost of interest-free capital
supplied by the Treasury, and earned surplus not returned to the
Treasury. Published statements show a net income of about $100
million from all RFC lending programs during the five years 1946—
1950; estimates on a full-cost basis put the five-year profit for the
combined programs at only about $21 million.77 Estimates developed
in congressional hearings in 1950, covering the business program
alone for twenty-one months in fiscal 1949, and 1950, indicate a net
75 Burr and Sette, op.cit.,p.57.
76 Eighteenth Report to Congress, Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington, January—June pp. 3 arid 4.
77 See page B-166.
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deficit of $13.6 million after provision for losses and as adjusted to
reflect the cost of all funds employed.78
For the similar but smaller program of the Federal Reserve Banks
during the period when it reached the widest variety of businesses an
unprofitable record is also indicated if allowance is made for realized.
and anticipated losses on loans and for interest on funds employed.
From 1934 up to the end of 1940 the combined operating accounts
of all twelve Reserve Banks for the Industrial loan program could
be summarized as followsThe preceding figures suggest that up
(1) Gross earnings (interest, fees, etc.)
. $7,411,783
(2) Deduct: Administrative expenses $3,976,848
Interest on funds supplied' by
U.S. Treasury (1% percent x
$27.5million X 5 years) 2,406,250
Total expense
. 6,883,098
(3) Net income before losses 1,028,635
(4) Losses charged off 480,293
(5) Balance - . 598,342
(6) Estimated losses at December 31, 1940 2,447,459
(7) Estimated net deficit ($1,849,117)
to the end of 1940, Federal Reserve Bank charges would have had
to be aboutpercent higher to have enabled the banks as a group
to break even on the industrial loan program.. By the end of 1951,
recoveries on losses previously written off and withdrawals from
allowances for estimated losses in consequence of the inflationary
boom during and after World War II had eliminated the net deficit.
The figures appearing above, however, appear to represent the
normal results of the program in a stable economic environment.
This picture of the operating results of the Section 18b loan pro-
gram in all Federal Reserve Banks finds confirmation in Rosa's analy-
sis of the New York Federal Reserve Bank's experience. Rosa. found
that aggregate gross earnings were roughly double out-of-pocket
administrative expenses, and that the balance of net income was
just equal to realized losses. Provision for interest on funds em-
ployed, anticipated future losses, and overhead expense absorbed by
78 See Appendix Table B-52.
79 From an unpublished study by the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System.
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the New York Federal Reserve Bank created a considerable deficit
in the operation.8°
Most successful of the federal agencies supplying business credit,
from the point of view of operating net income, has been the Export-
Import Bank. This institution has been required only since 1945 to
pay interest on its Treasury borrowings. Yet its gross income from
operations has been so large from the beginning that, if the bank had
paid interest or dividends intothe Treasury on all funds advanced
to it since its establishment at a rate representing the interest cost
of those funds to the Treasury, its earned surplus at the end of
1951 would still have amounted to $165.7 million as compared to
the reported figure of million as of that date.81 From Febru-
ary to June 1954 results were as follows :82
(1) Gross income (interest, fees) $563,191,520
(2) ExpenseS:
(a) Administrative expense $9,489,670
(b) Interest paid U.S. Treasury 116,841,6218
(c) Dividends paid U.S. Treasury 105,905,178
Total 222,746,799
(3) Losses 496,068
(4) Net retained earnings $330,508,983
aRepresentsinterest paid on new borrowings from 1945 on.
The sources of the Export—Import Bank's profitability, in compari-
son with other public suppliers of credit to business, have been a
very large average loan size and an exceedingly low administra-
tive outlay arising from a compact, centralized operation. The
remarkable record of profitability may also be attributed to the
fact that the bank has been the sole and official foreign lending agency
of the United States government; as such, it has been in a position
to minimize risks and losses in ways not open to other federal credit
agencies or to private institutions.
Operating results of the war loan guaranty program under Regu-
lation V are not known precisely, because the expenditures of the
Federal Reserve Board (as agent) and of the military procurement
agencies (as loan guarantors) that were allocable to the administra-
80 Rosa, op.cit., pp. lOf.
81 Thirteenth Report to Congre83, Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington, July—December 1951, p. 21.
82 Eighteenth Semiannua' Report to Congress, Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington, January—June 1954, p. 4.
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tion of the program are not available. Other gross revenue and ex-
pense items up to the end of 1949 were as follows:83 Prima facie, it
(1) Gross income (guaranty and commitment
fees and interest) $35.0 million
(2) Expenses deductible:
(a) Reimbursable expense of Reserve Banks $3.6 million
(b) Estimated losses 6.3
(c) Paid to banks by guarantors 1.7
Total 11.6
(3) Balance before FRB and military agency expenses: $23.4 million
would appear that the V-loan program was at least self-supporting
and possibly profitable to the government.
The guaranty and insurance of small business loans by the VA
was frankly intended to be a subsidy to veterans who desired to enter
business and showed reasonable likelihood of success; no charge was
made for those services. Yet it is of interest to know the èosts of the
credit services, and what charge would have had to be made for them
if they were priced at full cost. 'Although the Veterans' Administra-
tion has published no official statement of the costs of, administering
the loan guaranty and insurance programs, data made available by
it make possible a rough estimate of its expenditures from the be-
ginning of the program in 1944 up to the 'end of For the
business loan program alone, the expenditures may be estimated as
follows .84
(1) Gratuities of 4 percent paid veterans $ 5,848,000
(2) Net cost of claims paid by the government 8,496,000
(8) Direct salary and other costs of loan origination 3,336,00084
(4) Direct salary and other costs of loan servicing
and liquidation
, 5,679,00084
(5)Officeand other overhead expenses 1,808,00084
Total expenses $25,162,000
Up to the end of 1952, 198,1134 individual business loans had
been closed and disbursed in a total principal amoUnt of
83Burr and Sette, op.cit., pp. 57f.
84 Through 1952, total direct administrative costs charged to the loan guaranty
program (including home, farm and business loans) was $70,374,244' and general
administrative expenses including office and other overhead costs were estimated
at 20 percent of total direct costs. About 75 percent of total costs charged to the
loan guaranty program are assumed to have been expended in loan origination,
and 25 percent in loan servicing and liquidation. Loan origination expenses are
assumed to be allocable among the home, farm, and business loan programs in
proportion to number of loans disbursed, and loan servicing and liquidation ex-
penses in proportion to number of claims filed after default.
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769,000,oran average amount per loan of Total expenses
formed percent. of the aggregate principal amount of funds
loaned, and 15.1 percent of the guaranty or insurance of all loans.
The cost of guaranty or insurance has averaged about per
loan. In summary, it appears that the VA would have had to charge
"premiums" of about 5 percent of the total principal amount of busi-
ness loans disbursed, or of about 15 percent of the guaranteed por-
tion of such loans, in order to break even on the operation.
Impact on BusinessEnterprisesandBusiness
Financing Institutions
RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CREDIT AIDS TO BUSINESS
In comparison to the total amount of credit utilized by business,
that supplied by public lending institutions has been small. Table 46
records year-end outstandings of business loans and loan guarantees
by federal and federally sponsored agencies from 1918 through 1953,
shows the percentage ratio of federal credit to the total debt owed
by business corporations, and measures similarly the outstandings
of the principal private lending institutions: for life insurance com-
panies, their investments in stocks and bonds (mainly bonds) of
business and industrial corporations; for commercial banks, their
loans to, and investments in bond and security offerings of, com-
mercial enterprises.86 Through 1941 the ratio of federal business
credit to total corporate debt never rose much above 1 percent. At
its highest, in 1943 and 1949, it was only 3 percent. Life insurance
companies and commercial banks were each supplying about eight
eight times as much business credit as federal agencies at the end
of 1953. There is to be observed, however, a mild secular uptrend
in the relative importance of federal credit in the total debt of
American business.
85 Finance, Gnaranty of Loans, Veterans' Administration, December 1952, p. 71.
86 The data are not strictly comparable because of different definitions of busi-
ness by the several types of lender and because total debt refers only to the net
corporate long- and short-term debt exclusive of that owed by unincorporated
businesses. Despite these deficiencies the comparisons are believed to be meaning-
ful.
Inclusion of loan guarantees in the amoñnt of federal credit causes some over-
lapping (from 1934 on) with the bank figures. Loan guarantees were important
during World War II, and in 1943 and 1944 even exceeded federal loans. From
1946 through 1953 they comprised less than 20 percent of federal credit, Or less.
For series measuring federal credit both inclusive and exclusive of guarantees
against a differently constructed debt total, see Table 7 in Chapter 2.
276BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTTONS
Only an incomplete picture of the relative importance of public
and private credit to financial institutions can be given. Loans made
directly by commercial banks to other banking institutions are re-
ported regularly, but there are many other types of financial as-
sistance furnished by one private agency to another on which in-
formation is lacking—for example, purchases of stock or shares.
Federal lending to financial institutions before 1932 was negligible;
but in that year over $1 billion was advanced. By 1940, the debt of
financial institutions to public 'agencies had been reduced to $373
million, yet was nearly five times as large as the combined total ($77
million)of loans to commercial banks and mutual savings banks held
by other banks and of the amount owed by savings and loan associa-
tions apart from their indebtedness to the Federal Home Loan
Banks (Table 3, Chapter 2). For financial institutions, therefore,
loans of government agencies were for a time very much more im-
portant than their borrowing from private sources. By 1950, the
indebtedness of private lending institutions to public agencies had
all been retired (except for some. $800 million of outstanding loans
by the Home Loan Bank to savings and loan associations—ulti-
mately, a credit aid to the housing sector, since the associations lend
almost exclusively on mortgage security). Public holdings of stocks
and shares of financial institutions were considerable in the late
thirties and early forties (Chart 13, above). Their relative impor-
tance can be judged only for savings and loan associations. Govern-
ment-supplied capital in 1940 was about 5.1 percent of the amount
of the private savings capital then in use by the associations; in
1951, government contributions to capital had been entirely
As of the end of 1953, government capital (in the form of RFC in-.
vestment in' capital stock, notes, and debentures) had also been
largely retired from banks, trust companies, and insurance com-
panies.
It may be concluded that on an aggregate basis, federal credit to
business has not been large enough to exert important over-all effects
on employment and production, on the formation of new enterprises,
on the size of the business population, or on the average asset-and-
liability structure of American enterprises; and effectgovernmen-
tal influence on the stability of the supply of business credit has been
87SeeAppendix Tables A-li and A—19 for data on outstanding amounts of fed-
erally held savings and loan association shares. For data on outstanding amounts



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































zBUSINESS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
through aid to lending institutions rather than to businesses directly.
Federal lending programs in the business field appear, however, to
have had a selective effect on the allocation of economic resources
through aid to particular types of business firms.
SELECTIVE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL CREDIT
AIDS ON THE ]3USINESS POPULATION
In the first place, federal agencies provided a very significant meas-
ure of assistance to firms in certain industries: notably, railroad
transportation, ocean shipping, and. foreign.trade.Railroad loan
programs have been conducted by several federal agencies since
1918; the merchant shipping industry has likewise received a con-
siderable fraction of its credit from federal agencies; and foreign
trading enterprises, and domestic manufacturing enterprises heavily
dependent upon foreign markets, have been aided importantly by
the Export-Import Bank. There is no, means, however, of measuring
precisely the effects of federal credit even in these areas where it
has been of relatively great importance.
Second, federal loans and loan guarantees have provided signifi-
cant assistance to new firms and new industries, helping them through.
periods of trial to the point where some have been able to obtain
funds from private financial institutions. The Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation made many loans to firms in relatively unfamiliar
lines, unable to obtain private credit for lack of data on which the
private creditors could gauge the risks involved. This appears to
have been true of RFC loans to motels, fresh-frozen food canning
and packing firms, petro-chemical firms, and food locker enterprises.
It was also true of Veterans' Administration guarantees and insur-
ance of very small term loans to enable veterans to initiate or to
purchase small enterprises.
Newly established and very small firms have been assisted not only
through VA protection of privately made loans but also through
financing by the RFC, Federal Reserve Banks, and the Smaller War
Plants Corporation. Credit from private financial institutions has
rarely been a factor in the financing of new, small ventures, because
the risks have been considered too high to lie within thern commercial
banking range. Public agencies, however, have made a considerable
number of such small business loans, have invited and occasionally
received private institutional participation, and have to some extent
loosened up the credit market for the new, small enterprise. They
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have shown that the risks of such lending may be kept within tolera-
ble limits by taking appropriate collateral security. Undoubtedly,
many bankers who gained familiarity with lending operations of that
type through participation in a defense loan guaranteed by a federal
agency have been led to continue them without federal cooperation.
Third, federal agencies have carried on a certain amount of
marginal financing for firms which were financially weak but which
appeared to have reasonable prospects of success and for profitable
firms whose rapid market growth had outstripped their financial re-
sources. Marginal financing was provided especially by the loans of
Federal Reserve Banks to mercantile and manufacturing ventures
and by the loans of the RFC. A large part of the guarantees of war
production loans by the War and Navy Departments and the U.S.
Maritime Commission were also of that character.
To summarize: although federal credit aids to business probably
have not exerted a powerful influence on the aggregate of resources
employed in business, they have significantly influenced the move-
ment of resources into (or their retention in) a few established in-
dustries considered essential to national security, into certain com-
paratively new industries, and into firms whose financial conditions
were marginal as regards the availability of credit from private
financial institutions. Whether these resource-allocational effects
have been socially beneficial on balance, and whether more efficient
methods of achieving them might have been devised, are issues beyond
the purview of this study.
EFFECTS ON BUSINESS FINANCING
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES
The most significant effects of federal credit programs on the
business sector of the economy appear to have been the institutional
changes brought about in the markets, credit practices, and economic
roles played by private business financing agencies. Furthermore,
over a sufficiently long period of time, such institutional effects
ultimately may produce material changes in the utilization of re-
sources. We shall consider, in turn, the following institutional effects:
first, the effects of federal aid to financial institutions on their risk-
taking ability; second, the effects of federal business credit services
on the size of the credit markets confronting private institutions;
third, competitive relationships between federal agencies and private
institutions in extending credit to business; fourth, effects of federal
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lending and loan guaranteeing operations on the term to maturity,
collateral security requirements, and other terms of credit.
1. Federal credit and capital to support commercial banks and
life insurance companies maintained the solvency, enhanced the risk-
taking ability, and strengthened private financial institutions during
periods of severe economic strain. The most extensive and dramatic
use of federal financial aid for these purposes was in the RFC bank
loan and capital programs of 1932—1934. RFC loans to banks were
of two types: "confidence" loans made to active banks for the pur-
pose of enabling them to keep open, and liquidation loans to closed
banks to. facilitate an early discharge of their deposi.tor claims. The
first type of loan predominated up to March 1933, when the national
"bank holiday", occurred; thereafter the second type of loan was
most frequent. Between February 1932 and March. 31, 1933, RFC
authorized 10,178 loans to 6,100banksand trust companies under
which $1 billion was disbursed. The RFC also invested nearly $1.2
billion in preferred stock, capital notes, and debentures of 6,104
banks.88
2. Federal credit programs undoubtedly exerted a net expansive
Influence on the markets for private financing institutions, thereby
increasing their earning power, equity investment, and financial
strength. Federal credit maintained and supported private credit
institutions by means of direct loans and by relieving them of assets
believed to be illiquid or undesirable. By injecting credit into the
economy at numerous points, federal agencies also raised the level
of production and the demand for private credit. It is important
to observe in this connection that federal credit aids to agriculture
and to housing, as well as directly to business, have indirectly created
new demands for loans by business firms from private financial in-
stitutions. Thus, federal financing of farmers• enlarged the credit
demands of food processors; and federal credit for home construc-
tion created needs for private bank loans among building contractors
and building material and equipment manufacturers.
3. Although it is certain that federal credit activities have brought
about a net expansion in the market for private business financing,
88 Jesse H. Jones with Edward Angly, Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years
the RFC Macmillan, 1951, pp. 25 and 614f. See Chapters I—V
for an absorbing account o.f the circumstances under which these programs were
executed. For an appraisal of the economic effects of the programs, see The Re-
construction Finance Corporation, 19313—1941, by James B. 'Eckert (unpublished
dissertation, Cornell University, 1947), Chapter V.
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they have also operated in certain respects to compete with, and
to restrict the markets of, banks and other private lending agencies.
The ways in which that influence took place' are not immediately
apparent, however, and, require an understanding of the nature of
competition in the rendering of credit services.
Competition in extending credit consists in offering loans at lower
interest rates, in offering more favorable repayment or collateraliza-
tion terms and conditions, in offering longer maturities on loans,
or in providing borrowers with such ancillary services as accounting
and financial advice, or general management counsel. The analysis
of competition in credit markets is further complicated by the fact
that borrowers differ with respect to the probability that they will
repay their debts, and because of differences in size, financial strength,
and probable future earning power. Even if the effective interest
rates charged, the terms and conditions of loans, and the ancillary
services offered by public and private lending institutions, were
identical, the two might still compete with each other in assuming
risks of different magnitudes. Credit is a highly differentiated com-
modity, and borrowers are not influenced to select one rather than
another lender merely by comparing nominal rates of: interest.
With these considerations in mind, it becomes apparent how
federal agencies may compete with private lenders, even though
public agencies are debarred by statute from making loans to busi-
nesses to whom private credit is available. For example, 11FC could
make a business loan which, because of small amount, high risk, or
large costs of loan administration, a commercial bank could not
afford to make at less than 7 percent annual interest. RFC adopted
a more or less standard rate: during most of its period of activity,
4 percent. By lending at this relatively low rate, RFC in effect un-
derpriced the credit by charging less than its full cost. It would not
necessarily eliminate RFC competition with a commercial bank for
*RFCto offer a participation in the loan to the bank, because a share
in the loan might still not be profitable to the bank at the low interest
rate fixed by RFC.
Neither do statutory measures for eliminating competition do
away with the encroachment on private credit markets which occurs
if federal agencies offer loans on more favorable terms (longer
maturities, less burdensome collateral requirements,. more lerient
treatment of defaults, etc.) to relatively high-cost or high-risk bor-
rowers at the same interest rates as are charged to low-cost or low-
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risk borrowers. The strong and pervasive tendency in public credit
operations toward standard interest rates and terms of loans has
been observed. Standard terms tend to make federal agencies the
most attractive sources of credit to borrowers to whom private in-
stitutions can advance funds only at comparatively high interest
rates and on. closely restricted terms. It is in the high-risk segment
of the credit market that the operations of federal agencies have
cut most deeply into the potential loan markets of banks and other
private lenders. To minimize this kind of competition between private
and public credit agencies• would require: first, changes in public
policy permitting encouraging banks to take longer risks and
to charge commensurately higher interest rates ;89second,policies
of public, credit agencies that gear their charges for loans to indi-
vidual borrowers more closely to .theactual risks and costs of loan
administration, and abandonment of a standard loan rate; third, a
policy of public credit 'agencies to offer commitments to purchase
participations in the loans of private agencies for a fee measuring
as accurately as possible the costs and risks involved, and to sell to
private institutions their interests in loans originated by them.9°
4. Another institutional effect of federal business credit programs
has been an extension of the use of the amortized term loan, running
for periods exceeding one year and repayable in periodic installments.
It is notable that all of the federal agencies loaning money to busi-
ness have extended term loans almost exclusively. The amortized
term loan has been a development of the past twenty years. It has
to a considerable extent replaced the traditional short-term, single
payment, promissory note that was often paid up annually and
renewed by the business borrower. A number of factors account for
the development of term lending by commercial banks during the
middle thirties; but the credit activities of the RFC and the Federal
Reserve Banks in making term loans beginning in helped set
the stage for an expansion of private financing of this type. Public
89Usurylaws, strong banking conventions against high loan rates, and public
supervision of banking which has discouraged risk assumption by banks, have all
operated to cause banks to abdicate their position in the high-risk loan market.
The problem is not strictly one of competition by the federal credit agencies; it is,
rather, that public policy proscribes banking service in a particular segment of
the business credit market, a segment where federal agencies then step in to meet
the demand.
90See"Government, Loan Agencies and Commercial Banking," by Neil H.
Jacoby, American Economic Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 1,March1942, pp. 258f.
for a more complete discussion of these measures.
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agencies facilitated the extension of bank term credits by offering
to, and taking from, commercial banks substantial participations in
term loans. The familiarity with medium-term loans gained by com-
mercial bankers from observations of, or participation in, term
credits of the public agencies was to a large extent responsible for
private term lending.
A similar process may be observed in connection with the term
credits granted by the Export-Import Bank after to finance
the movement of American machinery and equipment into the hands
of foreign enterprises and governments. Here again, medium- or
long-term export credits have rarely been available from American
commercial banks; yet a number of years are required before the
earning power of exported equipment can produce the means of
repaying its purchase price. Such long-term export credits were
first provided by the Export-Import Bank.
The Veterans' Administration, through its guaranty or insurance
of small-term loans made by commercial banks or other lending in-
stitutions to veterans to purchase or establish businesses, also pio-
neered in sponsoring the application of the amortized term• loan
principle to new and very small enterprises. As a result of a strong
desire to assist returning .veterans, and of the risk sharing under-
taken by the VA, commercial banks were induced to enter a new field
of lending. Many bankers gradually learned how to make these
small business term loans safely and profitably.
Federal agencies have performed in the field of business credit
an economic function similar to that discharged by them in the
field of housing credit. They have tended to lengthen the maturities
of loans and to broaden the use of the amortized loan. In this respect,
they fostered an adjustment in the nature of business credit respon-
sive to the increasing use of durable producers goods by business
enterprise in the American economy. The term lending principle has
brought commercial banks new problems of portfolio management
and of liquidity maintenance; but undoubtedly it has helped business
enterprises by relating repayments to earning power.
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